Article 1. Whether pain serves a function?

Objection 1. It seems that pain does not serve a function, for pain is a result of evil, which is a privation of good. Since good is that which all things seek, it follows that pain, being an effect of evil, is utterly purposeless and without any function.

Objection 2. Further, Augustine says, "God is not the author of all that we suffer." If pain had a legitimate function, it would imply that God, who is all-good, is a cause of our suffering, which seems incongruous with His nature.

Objection 3. Moreover, if pain served a function, it would not be something to be avoided at all costs. Yet, we observe that all creatures naturally strive to avoid pain, suggesting that it is merely a harmful accident of existence, rather than serving any positive function.

On the contrary, In the Scriptures, it is said, "For whom the Lord loveth, he chastiseth; and he scourgeth every son whom he receiveth" (Hebrews 12:6). This indicates that pain, in the form of chastisement, serves a function in the divine economy, specifically in the moral and spiritual development of human beings.

I answer that, Pain, both physical and spiritual, serves several functions within the context of a world marred by sin. First, it serves as a consequence of sin, reminding human beings of the disorder introduced into the world by their actions. As such, it acts as a deterrent against further sin. Second, pain has a purgative function, as it can lead souls to purification and detachment from temporal goods, directing their desires towards the ultimate Good, which is God. Third, pain participates in the economy of salvation by offering individuals a share in Christ's sufferings, as the Apostle Paul states, "I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and in my flesh I am filling up what is lacking in the afflictions of Christ on behalf of his body, which is the church" (Colossians 1:24). Therefore, pain, while a consequence of the fallen state of the world, is woven by Divine Providence into a means for moral and spiritual growth, and ultimately, for union with God.

Reply to Objection 1. While pain is indeed a result of evil, it does not follow that it is purposeless. In the divine economy, even the consequences of evil are turned towards the good of souls. As Augustine notes, "God judged it better to bring good out of evil than not to permit any evil to exist."

Reply to Objection 2. God permits pain and suffering for a greater good, as a just judge and loving Father. He is not the direct cause of pain but allows it within His providence for our correction and sanctification.

Reply to Objection 3. The natural aversion to pain is a consequence of the instinct for self-preservation, which is good. However, this does not negate the fact that pain, when it occurs, can be directed towards a higher purpose, transforming it from a mere evil to be avoided into a means of achieving spiritual good.

References:

1. Hebrews 12:6
   https://www.newadvent.org/bible/heb012.htm
2. Colossians 1:24
   https://www.newadvent.org/bible/col001.htm

Article 2. Whether physical pain serves a primary function in the natural world of animals?

Objection 1. It seems that physical pain does not serve a primary function in the natural world of animals, for animals, lacking rational souls, cannot derive moral or spiritual lessons from their suffering. Therefore, pain, being devoid of such higher purposes, seems unnecessary and without function in the lives of animals.

Objection 2. Further, if physical pain had a primary function in the natural world, it would imply that all instances of animal suffering are meaningful and purposeful. Yet, we observe much seemingly pointless suffering in the animal kingdom, which suggests that pain is an accidental feature of life, not serving any specific function.

Objection 3. Moreover, if the primary function of pain were beneficial, we would not observe animals instinctively avoiding pain at all costs. This natural aversion to pain suggests that it is fundamentally harmful, lacking a constructive role in the lives of animals.

On the contrary, The Philosopher, Aristotle, observes in his works on natural history that pain and pleasure are significant in the lives of animals, guiding them towards what is conducive to their survival and away from what is harmful. Thus, it seems that physical pain, even in animals, serves a critical function.

I answer that, Physical pain in animals serves as a vital mechanism for survival. Its primary function is to signal harm or potential harm to the organism, thereby encouraging avoidance behaviors that protect the animal from injury, disease, or death. Pain sensations are integral to the natural instinct of self-preservation, guiding animals in their interactions with their environment and with other beings. For instance, pain causes an animal to withdraw from harmful stimuli, such as fire, sharp objects, or predators, thus preserving its life. Additionally, pain can signal the need for rest and recovery, as in the case of an injured animal that limits its movement to heal. Therefore, the primary function of physical pain in the animal kingdom is to act as a protective and corrective mechanism, ensuring the well-being and continuity of each species.

Reply to Objection 1. While it is true that animals cannot derive moral or spiritual lessons from pain as humans can, this does not mean that pain lacks a function in their lives. The function of pain in animals is more immediate and practical, relating directly to their physical well-being and survival.

Reply to Objection 2. The observation of seemingly pointless suffering in the animal kingdom does not negate the primary function of pain but highlights the complexity of living in a fallen world. Even in such a world, pain generally serves a protective and corrective purpose, though not all instances of suffering can be easily understood or justified from a human perspective.

Reply to Objection 3. The natural aversion to pain, while indicative of its unpleasantness, does not imply that pain lacks a constructive role. Instead, this aversion is part of the mechanism by which pain fulfills its function—by motivating avoidance and protective behaviors.

References:

1. Aristotle, "History of Animals"

Article 3. Whether it is against natural law to use pain for asceticism?

Objection 1. It seems that it is against natural law to use pain for asceticism, for natural law, as derived from the nature of things, directs beings towards their own good and the avoidance of harm. Since pain is primarily a signal of danger or harm, deliberately seeking pain through ascetic practices contradicts this directive and thus appears to violate natural law.

Objection 2. Further, if the primary function of pain in the natural world is to signal danger and promote survival, then intentionally inflicting pain upon oneself for spiritual or ascetic reasons seems to misuse this natural signal, diverting it from its primary purpose. Therefore, such practices would be contrary to the natural order established by God.

Objection 3. Moreover, the Apostle Paul warns against those who demand ascetic practices, saying, "Which things have indeed a shew of wisdom in will worship, and humility, and neglecting of the body; not in any honour to the satisfying of the flesh" (Colossians 2:23). This suggests that seeking pain for its own sake under the guise of asceticism is not truly wise or virtuous but rather a form of self-imposed religion that goes against divine wisdom.

On the contrary, I have argued that "the New Law is a law of love rather than a law of fear" (ST I-II, Q. 108, A. 1), and that voluntary mortifications of the flesh, when undertaken with love and for the sake of spiritual growth, align with the spirit of the New Law by curbing the disordered desires of the flesh. The use of pain in ascetic practices, therefore, can be viewed not as a violation of natural law but as a means to restore the proper order of reason over appetites, in accordance with the ultimate ends of human nature.

I answer that, The use of pain in asceticism, when properly understood and moderated, is not against natural law but rather finds its justification within the broader context of natural and divine law's aims for human beings. Natural law indeed directs all beings to act in accordance with their nature and to seek their proper ends. In the case of human beings, this includes not only physical well-being but also moral and spiritual perfection. Ascetic practices, which may involve the voluntary acceptance of pain or discomfort, are aimed not at the pain itself but at the spiritual goods attained through such practices: mastery over one's passions, detachment from worldly pleasures, and growth in virtue and holiness. When undertaken with discretion, in the spirit of prayer and humility, and under proper guidance, asceticism serves to realign the disordered affections of the human heart towards the love of God and neighbor, thus fulfilling the deeper inclinations of natural law towards the good.

Reply to Objection 1. While natural law does direct beings towards their good and the avoidance of harm, it also encompasses the rational pursuit of higher goods, even if this pursuit involves temporary hardship or discomfort. The use of pain in asceticism is not for the sake of pain itself but for the sake of overcoming disordered attachments and growing in virtue.

Reply to Objection 2. Ascetic practices do not misuse the signal of pain but rather employ it within a rational framework aimed at spiritual growth. This higher purpose does not contradict the natural function of pain but extends the application of natural principles to the moral and spiritual dimensions of human life.

Reply to Objection 3. The admonition of the Apostle Paul is directed against those who practice asceticism in a way that lacks true love and humility, or who impose it on others as a means of achieving righteousness apart from faith. Properly understood, asceticism is not about neglecting the body for its own sake but about disciplining the body to serve the higher spiritual ends for which human beings are created.

References:

1. ST I-II, Q. 108, A. 1
   https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2108.htm#article1
2. Colossians 2:23
   https://www.newadvent.org/bible/col002.htm

Article 4. Whether acting against natural law, given the right attitude, can be justified for spiritual growth, thereby undermining the logic behind moral theology based on Aristotelian natural law?

Objection 1. It seems that acting against natural law for spiritual growth cannot be justified, as natural law, being an expression of God's eternal law, dictates the fundamental principles of moral action that are conducive to human flourishing. Therefore, any act that goes against these principles, even with a spiritual intention, would seem to detract from, rather than contribute to, true human fulfillment and the common good.

Objection 2. Further, Aristotle's concept of natural law, which underpins much of Christian moral theology, emphasizes acting in accordance with virtue to achieve the ultimate good, which is happiness. Since virtue entails acting according to right reason, intentionally acting against natural law, even for spiritual reasons, contradicts the very essence of virtue and the purpose of moral action.

Objection 3. Moreover, if it were permissible to act against natural law for the sake of spiritual growth, this would introduce a relativism into moral theology, suggesting that moral absolutes can be disregarded based on subjective intentions. This would undermine the universal and immutable nature of moral principles derived from natural law, leading to moral confusion and the justification of inherently disordered acts.

On the contrary, In my work, I acknowledge that "the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law" (ST I-II, Q. 91, A. 2). However, I also emphasize the importance of the New Law, or the Law of Grace, which surpasses the Old Law and natural law by directing us towards interior acts of virtue, motivated by charity. The New Law perfects the natural law by infusing human actions with grace, enabling acts that, while seemingly contrary to natural inclinations, elevate the soul towards God.

I answer that, The assertion that acting against natural law can be justified for spiritual growth, under certain conditions, does not undermine the logic of moral theology based on Aristotelian natural law but rather reflects a deepening understanding of the law's fulfillment in the context of Christian revelation. Natural law outlines the basic moral principles according to human nature and reason. However, Christian moral theology, especially as it integrates and transcends Aristotelian ethics, recognizes that the ultimate end of human life is not merely natural happiness but supernatural beatitude—the vision of God.

In this light, acts of asceticism or other practices that might seem to contravene natural inclinations are not so much against natural law as they are beyond its basic precepts, oriented towards a higher good revealed and made accessible by grace. These acts, when properly oriented and moderated, do not negate the principles of natural law but fulfill them in a higher order of moral and spiritual life. Therefore, what is crucial is not the mere external conformity to natural law but the internal disposition of the heart towards God, which can sometimes necessitate actions that transcend natural inclinations for the sake of greater goods.

Reply to Objection 1. The eternal law, of which natural law is a participation, is fulfilled and perfected in the law of grace. Actions undertaken for spiritual growth, in the context of this higher law, do not detract from human fulfillment but lead to its ultimate realization in God.

Reply to Objection 2. Acting according to virtue does indeed require acting according to right reason. However, in the context of Christian morality, right reason is informed by faith and grace, which can elevate the natural understanding of good and direct it towards supernatural ends.

Reply to Objection 3. Rather than introducing moral relativism, the possibility of transcending natural inclinations for spiritual reasons underscores the distinction between merely natural goods and the ultimate supernatural good. This does not negate the universal principles of natural law but illustrates the primacy of the eternal law and the transformative power of grace in guiding human actions towards their ultimate end.

References:

1. ST I-II, Q. 91, A. 2
   https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2091.htm#article2

Article 5. Whether, according to Aristotelian natural law, asceticism is against natural law?

Objection 1. It might appear that asceticism is not against Aristotelian natural law, for Aristotle himself values the virtue of temperance, which involves a certain restraint or control over bodily desires. Since ascetic practices can be seen as extensions of temperance, one might argue that they align with Aristotelian principles by promoting rational control over appetite.

Objection 2. Further, Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics discusses the mean between excess and deficiency in regard to virtues. Since asceticism can be understood as a practice aiming at finding the right mean in the use of external goods and pleasures, it could be seen as compatible with Aristotelian ethics, which promotes moderation and balance.

On the contrary, Strictly speaking, according to Aristotelian natural law, asceticism, particularly in its more extreme forms that involve deliberate affliction of the body beyond simple moderation, can be seen as against natural law. Aristotle's concept of natural law focuses on fulfilling the natural ends and functions of human beings, emphasizing the pursuit of virtue within the context of living a balanced and flourishing life. Extreme asceticism, which may involve the rejection of bodily pleasures to the point of physical suffering, does not align with Aristotle's vision of the good life, which holds that virtue lies in a mean relative to us, determined by reason.

I answer that, It must be admitted that, strictly speaking within the framework of Aristotelian natural law, practices of asceticism, especially those involving significant physical austerity or the deliberate infliction of pain, diverge from the Aristotelian understanding of natural law. Aristotle's ethics prioritize the achievement of eudaimonia—human flourishing—through the exercise of virtue, which inherently involves the enjoyment of certain bodily and external goods in moderation. Aristotle sees the good life as one where rational activity is exercised in accordance with virtue, and while this includes the virtue of temperance, it does not extend to the renunciation of bodily goods to the extent often found in ascetic practices.

In this context, extreme forms of asceticism may be viewed as contrary to Aristotelian natural law because they seem to reject the natural goods of health, pleasure, and social engagement, which are considered integral to human flourishing. For Aristotle, the purpose of life is the exercise of rational virtues in a way that maintains the health and integrity of the body and soul, within the bounds of the polis—the community. Ascetic practices that significantly harm the body or wholly reject societal norms for the sake of spiritual or moral discipline fall outside this framework.

Reply to Objection 1. While temperance is indeed a virtue in Aristotelian ethics, it is defined by moderation and the rational enjoyment of pleasures, not the wholesale rejection or affliction of the body that can be characteristic of asceticism.

Reply to Objection 2. Although asceticism might aim at a form of moderation in external goods and pleasures, the extreme denial and physical disciplines associated with it surpass the Aristotelian mean, which advocates for a balanced enjoyment of life's goods as part of the pursuit of virtue and happiness.

Having admitted this divergence from Aristotelian natural law, it is important to recognize that Christian theological tradition, particularly in the works of later thinkers like myself, Thomas Aquinas, reinterprets and expands upon Aristotelian ethics within the context of Christian morality. In this expanded view, the voluntary renunciation of earthly pleasures and the embrace of ascetic practices are seen not as ends in themselves but as means to deepen one's relationship with God, cultivate virtue, and achieve spiritual purification. This reinterpretation situates asceticism within a broader teleological framework, where the ultimate end is not merely human flourishing as conceived by Aristotle but the beatific vision and union with God.

References:

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics

Article 6. Whether the need to reinterpret Aristotelian natural law within the Christian theological framework undermines the assertion that God's revelation concerning morality can be independently derived by means of philosophical reason?

Objection 1. It seems that the need to reinterpret Aristotelian natural law within a Christian framework does not undermine the assertion that God's revelation concerning morality can be independently derived by means of philosophical reason. For natural law, as understood by Aristotle, provides a foundation upon which Christian theology builds, rather than contradicting or negating the principles of faith. Therefore, the enrichment of Aristotelian ethics by Christian revelation does not weaken but rather deepens our understanding of morality.

Objection 2. Further, if philosophical reason were incapable of arriving at true moral principles without divine revelation, this would imply that those without access to revelation are without access to moral truth. Yet, I have maintained that certain moral truths can be known through natural reason, suggesting that revelation complements rather than supersedes the capacity of reason to discern the moral law.

Objection 3. Moreover, the harmonization of Aristotelian natural law with Christian theology demonstrates the universality and compatibility of truth, rather than its weakness. The fact that Christian theology can incorporate and elevate Aristotelian ethics suggests not a deficiency in philosophical reason, but the transcendence and fulfillment of natural law in divine revelation.

On the contrary, It must be acknowledged that while natural law, as articulated by philosophers such as Aristotle, provides a rational basis for understanding moral principles, the fullness of moral truth as revealed by God extends beyond the limits of human reason. The Incarnation, the Trinity, and the beatific vision are truths of faith not attainable by reason alone. Therefore, while philosophical reason can apprehend many aspects of the moral law, it cannot, without revelation, grasp the entirety of God's moral vision for humanity.

I answer that, The integration of Aristotelian natural law within a Christian theological framework does not so much undermine the assertion that God's revelation concerning morality can be independently derived by means of philosophical reason, as it highlights the complementary roles of faith and reason in discerning the full scope of moral truth. Aristotelian ethics, with its emphasis on virtue and the pursuit of the good life through rational activity, lays a foundational understanding of morality that resonates with the natural law inscribed in the human heart. However, Christian revelation illuminates and perfects this understanding by revealing higher ends and supernatural virtues that fulfill and transcend natural human capacities.

This does not weaken the role of philosophical reason but underscores the Christian doctrine that grace does not destroy nature but perfects it. The moral law, accessible to some extent through reason, finds its completion in the revealed law of love manifested in Christ. Thus, while philosophical reason alone may reach many true conclusions about morality, it is only in light of divine revelation that the fullness of moral truth, including the ultimate end of human life and the means to achieve it, is fully unveiled.

Reply to Objection 1. The enrichment of Aristotelian ethics by Christian theology does indeed deepen our understanding of morality, showing that faith and reason are not opposed but are complementary paths to truth.

Reply to Objection 2. The capacity of reason to discern moral truths independently of revelation does not negate the importance of divine revelation but shows that God has made certain aspects of the moral law knowable through the natural light of reason, thus ensuring that all people have some access to moral truth.

Reply to Objection 3. The harmonization of natural law with Christian theology indeed demonstrates the compatibility and fulfillment of truth found in divine revelation, highlighting the integral role of faith in completing and elevating the natural understanding of moral principles.

References: none

Article 7. Whether, within the Aristotelian framework of natural law, the natural purpose of ejaculation is confined to insemination during intercourse?

Objection 1. It seems that within the Aristotelian framework of natural law, the natural purpose of ejaculation is confined to insemination during intercourse. Aristotle, in his biological works, emphasizes the teleological nature of bodily functions, where each part of the body and its respective actions are directed towards specific ends. Since the primary biological end of ejaculation is reproduction, it would follow that its natural purpose is confined to insemination during intercourse.

Objection 2. Further, Aristotle's natural philosophy posits that nature does nothing in vain. If ejaculation were to serve purposes beyond insemination during intercourse, this would imply a superfluousness in nature's design, contradicting Aristotle's principle that every natural process has a purpose.

Objection 3. Moreover, if we were to argue that the natural purpose of ejaculation is not confined to insemination during intercourse, this could challenge the Aristotelian understanding of natural ends and purposes, leading to a relativization of natural functions that Aristotle's framework seeks to avoid.

On the contrary, The occurrence of spontaneous ejaculation during sleep, which Aristotle and later commentators acknowledge, indicates that the natural purpose of ejaculation may extend beyond mere insemination. This phenomenon suggests that there are additional natural purposes served by ejaculation, such as the expulsion of excess semen, which Aristotle might consider necessary for maintaining the balance and health of the body.

I answer that, Within the Aristotelian framework, natural processes and bodily functions are indeed directed towards specific ends; however, this does not preclude them from serving multiple purposes that contribute to the overall well-being and balance of the organism. Aristotle's philosophy allows for a nuanced understanding of natural purposes, where primary and secondary purposes can coexist. The primary purpose of ejaculation, in the context of reproduction, is insemination during intercourse. Yet, the occurrence of spontaneous ejaculation during sleep (nocturnal emissions) suggests a secondary natural purpose, such as the maintenance of physiological health or the balance of bodily humors, as was understood in the context of Aristotelian and medieval theories of medicine.

This secondary purpose does not negate the primary reproductive function but complements it, ensuring the individual's overall health and well-being. Thus, within the Aristotelian natural law framework, it is reasonable to conclude that while the primary purpose of ejaculation is insemination during intercourse, its natural purposes are not confined to this alone. The spontaneous occurrence of ejaculation during sleep serves as evidence of additional natural purposes, such as the regulation and maintenance of bodily health, which are consistent with Aristotle's broader teleological view of nature and natural functions.

Reply to Objection 1. While reproduction is the primary end of ejaculation, Aristotle's teleological perspective does not exclude secondary purposes that contribute to the optimal functioning and health of the organism.

Reply to Objection 2. The principle that nature does nothing in vain does not preclude a natural process from serving more than one purpose. Instead, it supports the view that all natural phenomena, including those with multiple purposes, contribute to the comprehensive and harmonious order of the natural world.

Reply to Objection 3. Acknowledging that ejaculation has purposes beyond insemination does not relativize natural functions but rather enriches our understanding of the complexity and wisdom of nature's design, in line with Aristotelian thought.

References: none

Article 8. Whether, within the Aristotelian natural law framework and without insights from Christianity, masturbation intended for stress relief is just a hygienic activity that aligns with the biological nature of the organism considered as a whole?

Objection 1. It seems that within the Aristotelian natural law framework, masturbation intended for stress relief cannot be considered just a hygienic activity that aligns with the biological nature of the organism. Aristotle, emphasizing the rational aspect of the human soul, argues that actions must be directed towards the good and the fulfillment of natural ends. Since masturbation does not fulfill a reproductive function, it appears to deviate from the natural purposes of sexual activity, thus not aligning with the organism's biological nature as understood by Aristotle.

Objection 2. Further, Aristotle's concept of virtue ethics centers around the mean between excess and deficiency, guided by rational principle. Masturbation, especially if practiced for reasons such as stress relief, might be seen as pursuing pleasure in excess of what is necessary for the well-being of the organism, thereby constituting a departure from the virtuous mean.

Objection 3. Moreover, within the Aristotelian framework, every part of the human being, including their desires and actions, is ordered towards the achievement of eudaimonia, or flourishing, which is realized through virtuous activities. Masturbation, being a solitary act that does not contribute to the communal or relational aspects of human flourishing, could be argued to fall outside of activities that Aristotle would consider conducive to true happiness.

On the contrary, If we consider the Aristotelian natural law framework strictly from a biological and non-religious standpoint, focusing on the organism's health and balance, one could argue that masturbation, when intended for stress relief, serves a regulatory or hygienic function similar to other bodily processes that aim to maintain the individual's health. From this perspective, if such an act is understood as contributing to the homeostasis of the organism by relieving stress, then it could be considered in alignment with the biological nature of the organism, provided it is practiced in moderation and does not detract from the individual's overall flourishing.

I answer that, The Aristotelian natural law framework, when considered without the insights from Christianity, primarily evaluates actions in terms of their contribution to the individual's rational and social flourishing. While Aristotle himself does not directly address the issue of masturbation, his philosophical principles emphasize the importance of actions being oriented towards the good and being in accordance with virtue. From an Aristotelian viewpoint, the key considerations would be whether the action contributes to or detracts from the individual's eudaimonia and whether it is in accordance with the virtues of moderation, courage, and practical wisdom.

Thus, while masturbation for stress relief might be seen as serving a physiological function or contributing to the individual's immediate sense of well-being, it would be necessary to consider whether this action aligns with the broader Aristotelian criteria of contributing to the rational and virtuous life. This includes considering whether it fosters self-control, whether it is practiced in moderation, and how it fits within the individual's overall pursuit of virtue and flourishing.

Reply to Objection 1. Although masturbation does not fulfill a reproductive function, within a strictly biological consideration, actions that contribute to the individual's physiological well-being might be seen as aligning with natural purposes, provided they do not lead to excess or harm.

Reply to Objection 2. The virtue of moderation is key; if masturbation is used as a means of stress relief in a way that respects the balance and does not lead to excess, it might be argued to fall within the range of actions permissible under a broad interpretation of Aristotelian ethics focused on maintaining health and balance.

Reply to Objection 3. While true flourishing in the Aristotelian sense encompasses communal and relational goods, the maintenance of personal health and well-being is also essential for an individual to engage fully in the virtuous life and contribute to the polis. Therefore, actions that contribute to personal health, when practiced in moderation, could be considered part of a broader strategy for achieving eudaimonia.

References: none

Article 9. Whether the integration of Christianity transforms an act considered as a possibly natural good within the Aristotelian framework into a sin against nature, and what this implies about the use of the Aristotelian framework within Christian morality?

Objection 1. It seems that the integration of Christianity does not necessarily convert an act considered as a natural good within the Aristotelian framework into a sin against nature, for Christianity fulfills and perfects natural law rather than nullifying it. Therefore, the harmonization of Christian ethics with Aristotelian natural law should not lead to contradictions but to a deeper understanding of the moral order.

Objection 2. Further, if the admixture of Christian morality always had the power to overturn the verdicts of Aristotelian natural law, this would imply that Aristotelian ethics lacks any stable or reliable moral foundation, making it an unsuitable basis for Christian moral theology. This contradicts the extensive use of Aristotelian thought by Christian theologians, including myself, Thomas Aquinas, in constructing a coherent moral framework.

Objection 3. Moreover, the assertion that Christianity converts a natural good act into a grave sin suggests a misunderstanding of Christian moral teaching, which does not arbitrarily designate natural acts as sinful but evaluates them in the context of their orientation towards God's will and the ultimate end of human beings.

On the contrary, The integration of Christian moral principles into the Aristotelian framework does indeed lead to a re-evaluation of certain acts that Aristotle might consider naturally permissible. This re-evaluation is based on the Christian understanding of the purpose of human life, the nature of sin, and the ultimate end of human beings, which transcend the natural virtues and ends contemplated by Aristotle. For example, while asceticism might be viewed within an Aristotelian framework as contrary to natural good due to its seeming disregard for bodily well-being, Christianity sees in ascetic practices a means of spiritual purification and union with God, thus redefining the concept of natural good in light of supernatural ends.

I answer that, The integration of Christian morality with Aristotelian natural law does not simply suspend or overturn the verdicts of the latter but rather elevates and completes them by introducing a higher order of goods and ends. The Aristotelian framework, which focuses on the fulfillment of human capacities and the attainment of eudaimonia through virtuous living, provides a foundation for understanding the natural moral order. However, Christianity introduces a supernatural dimension to ethics that encompasses and surpasses natural virtues and ends.

In the case of acts such as masturbation, which may be considered within a purely Aristotelian framework as aligned with natural goods under certain interpretations, Christianity evaluates these acts in light of their conformity to divine law, the virtue of chastity, and the orientation of human sexuality towards the goods of marriage and procreation. From this perspective, acts that are oriented solely towards self-gratification without reference to their procreative and unitive purposes are seen as contrary to the proper ends of human sexuality as revealed by God.

Similarly, the Christian endorsement of asceticism, despite its apparent contradiction with Aristotelian principles that emphasize the moderation of bodily goods, reflects a reorientation of human desires towards the ultimate good, which is union with God. This does not imply a rejection of the Aristotelian framework but rather its fulfillment in a higher order of goods that Aristotle, working within the confines of natural reason alone, could not fully apprehend.

Reply to Objection 1. The fulfillment and perfection of natural law by Christian revelation do not negate the value of Aristotelian ethics but provide a context in which its principles are directed towards the ultimate end of human life.

Reply to Objection 2. The stability and reliability of Aristotelian ethics as a foundation for moral reasoning are not undermined but are enhanced by the light of Christian revelation, which clarifies and elevates the natural ends contemplated by Aristotle.

Reply to Objection 3. Christian moral teaching does not arbitrarily designate natural acts as sinful but reevaluates them in the context of a comprehensive understanding of human nature, purpose, and destiny revealed in Christ.

This discussion highlights the complementary roles of reason and faith in moral theology, where Aristotelian natural law provides a rational basis for ethical reasoning, which is then completed and perfected by the supernatural truths of Christian revelation.

References: none

As an emulation of Thomas Aquinas, I must clarify that in my original works, I did not directly address the topic of masturbation with the specific terminology and framing as presented in modern discussions. However, my writings on moral theology, including discussions on the virtues and vices, are deeply rooted in an understanding of natural law that integrates Aristotelian principles with Christian theology. This integrated perspective forms the basis of what might be termed "Christian natural law" in my works. The distinction between "Aristotelian natural law" and "Christian natural law" is a modern analytical tool to differentiate between the natural philosophical ethics of Aristotle and the natural law theory as it was further developed in a Christian theological context.

In light of this clarification and understanding the nuanced distinction between these frameworks, let's address the conceptual correction suggested:

Throughout the discussion, references to "natural law" in the context of my arguments should be understood as referring to "Christian natural law," which incorporates Aristotelian insights but also transcends them with Christian revelation and theological principles. This integrated form of natural law is what informs my moral theology, including my views on virtues, vices, and the moral evaluation of human actions.

When I discuss actions like asceticism or the moral evaluation of sexual acts within the framework of natural law, it is from this Christian natural law perspective, which evaluates human actions not only in terms of their adherence to natural reason and human flourishing (as Aristotle might consider) but also in their alignment with divine revelation and the ultimate end of human beings—union with God.

Therefore, the discussion on matters like the purpose of ejaculation, the practice of asceticism, or the moral evaluation of masturbation under the lens of natural law is fundamentally rooted in this Christian natural law perspective. This perspective considers the fullness of human nature, purpose, and destiny as revealed in Christian doctrine, integrating and elevating Aristotelian ethical principles within a broader theological and salvific context.

To adhere strictly to the request for clarity and precision, any previous references to "natural law" in my responses should be understood as referencing "Christian natural law" when discussing the moral theological framework that integrates Aristotelian ethics with Christian revelation and principles. This clarification is essential for understanding the basis of moral judgments and teachings within my body of work.

Article 10. Whether there exists only one way to arrive at moral truths, through Christian revelation, with the concept of natural law being a part of Christian theology inspired by revelation, rather than belonging purely to the philosophical realm?

Objection 1. It seems that there exists more than one way to arrive at moral truths, as the natural law concept, which predates Christian revelation, was extensively discussed by philosophers such as Aristotle. These discussions suggest that natural law and the moral truths derived from it can indeed be understood and accessed through the use of pure reason, independent of faith.

Objection 2. Further, if natural law were solely a product of Christian theology and not accessible through reason, it would follow that those outside the Christian faith could not arrive at moral truths. Yet, we observe that individuals of various cultures and beliefs demonstrate a common understanding of certain moral principles, suggesting a natural capacity to discern good and evil through reason.

Objection 3. Moreover, the Church Fathers and later Christian philosophers, including myself, Thomas Aquinas, have argued that reason is a gift from God that allows humans to discern the natural law written in their hearts, independent of their knowledge of Christian revelation. This indicates that natural law and the moral truths it contains are not solely confined to the realm of Christian theology.

On the contrary, The integration of natural law within Christian theology does indeed suggest that the fullest understanding of moral truths is achieved in the light of Christian revelation. However, this does not negate the role of reason in discerning moral truths. Christian theology holds that natural law, as part of God's creation, is inscribed in the human heart and accessible through reason, reflecting the order and wisdom of the Creator. Thus, while Christian revelation provides the clearest and most complete understanding of moral truths, natural law serves as a means by which reason can arrive at certain moral truths independently of revelation.

I answer that, The impression that there are two separate ways to arrive at moral truths—one through pure reason and the other through Christian revelation—arises from a misunderstanding of the relationship between reason and faith, and between natural law and divine law. In Christian theology, and particularly in my synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy with Christian doctrine, natural law is understood as the rational creature's participation in the eternal law (ST I-II, Q. 91, A. 2). This participation means that through reason, humans can discern fundamental moral principles that reflect the eternal law.

However, this capacity of reason does not operate in isolation from or in opposition to faith. Rather, reason and faith are complementary gifts from God, designed to lead humans to the truth. The natural law, accessible to reason, provides a common ground for all people, regardless of their faith, to recognize certain moral truths. Christian revelation, meanwhile, fulfills and perfects human understanding of moral law by revealing truths that surpass the capacity of reason alone, such as the nature of God, the call to love God above all things, and the destiny of human beings in relation to God.

Therefore, it is not accurate to say that there is only one way to arrive at moral truths solely through Christian revelation, with the concept of natural law being misrepresented as belonging to the philosophical realm. Rather, natural law represents the way in which reason can apprehend moral truths that are harmonious with, and fulfilled by, the deeper truths revealed in Christian theology. Christian revelation does not invalidate the truths arrived at through reason but elevates them, offering a fuller and more profound understanding of moral order and human destiny.

Reply to Objection 1. The existence of discussions on natural law by pre-Christian philosophers like Aristotle supports the view that reason can indeed arrive at certain moral truths independently of Christian revelation.

Reply to Objection 2. The common understanding of certain moral principles across cultures and beliefs underscores the universal accessibility of natural law through reason, affirming the capacity of human nature to discern fundamental aspects of the moral good.

Reply to Objection 3. The teaching that reason is a gift from God that allows humans to discern natural law independently of their knowledge of Christian revelation highlights the compatibility and complementarity of reason and faith in the pursuit of moral truth.

References: none